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LANDLORD - TENANT - TENANT HAS A CLAIM AGAINST 
LANDLORD FOR BREACH OF QUIET ENJOYMENT LEADING 
TO CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION WHEN LANDLORD FAILS TO 
ENFORCE A PROVISION IN ANOTHER TENANT'S LEASE 
THAT BARS EXCESSIVE NOISE. Bocchini v. Gorn Management Co., 
69 Md. App. 1,515 A.2d 1179 (1986). 
A tenant vacated an apartment prior to the expiration of the lease.! 
The landlord then brought suit for lost rent and other damages arising 
from the tenant's breach of the lease.2 The tenant filed a counterclaim 
against the landlord, alleging inter alia breach of the covenant of quiet 
enjoyment and constructive eviction.3 The tenant asserted that she va-
cated the apartment because of excessive noise made by another tenant.4 
The tenant further contended that the landlord failed to enforce a provi-
sion in the other tenant's lease that restricted excessive noise. 5 
The circuit court granted the landlord's motion to dismiss the 
breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and constructive eviction 
claims, and the tenant appealed. 6 The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land reversed the dismissal and held that a tenant has a claim against a 
landlord for breach of quiet enjoyment and constructive eviction when 
the landlord fails to enforce a provision in another tenant's lease that 
bars excessive noise. 7 
The law of landlord and tenant originated from English common 
law during a time when leaseholds were primarily for agricultural land. 8 
A landlord-tenant agreement created an estate in land rather than a con-
1. Carol Ann Bocchini first rented the apartment in 1978. The upstairs apartment was 
rented to the Seaberrys in 1979. The problems began in 1983 after the Seaberrys 
separated and Mrs. Seaberry began to associate with Mr. McClean. Ms. Bocchini 
first attempted to communicate directly with Mrs. Seaberry, but when those efforts 
failed, she contacted Gom Management in April of 1984. After several complaints 
from Ms. Bocchini, Gom Management acknowledged the problem and promised to 
take action. Gom Management's efforts to solve the problem in May and June 
failed. Ms. Bocchini complained again in June and July but was told by Gom Man-
agement that they would take no further action. Gom Management maintained 
their refusal to act after Ms. Bocchini's final complaint on August 1, 1984 concern-
ing obscenities and threats from Mr. McClean. Exhausted from a lack of sleep and 
in fear, Ms. Bocchini and her daughter went to stay with friends. They permanently 
moved out of the apartment on August 8, 1984. Bocchini v. Gom Management 
Co., 69 Md. App. 1,4-5, 515 A.2d 1179, 1181 (1986). 
2. Id. at 3,515 A.2d at 1180. 
3. Id. The counterclaim consisted of five counts: Breach of the covenant of quiet en-
joyment and constructive eviction (Count I); negligence (Count II); deceit (Count 
III); nuisance (Count IV); breach of MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-203(c) 
(1974) (concerning security deposits) (Count V). Id. at 3-4,515 A.2d at 1180-81. 
4. Bocchini, 69 Md. App. at 3, 515 A.2d at 1180. 
5. Id. at 5, 515 A.2d at 1181. 
6. /d. at 4, 515 A.2d at 1181. 
7. Id. at 22,515 A.2d at 1190. 
8. R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 1:1, at I (1980); 
3 G. THOMPSON, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 1028, at 83 (1980); see Lesar, 
Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1279, 1280 (1960). 
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tract imposing personal obligations.9 Accordingly, the tenant became an 
owner of a possessory interest in the land, thereby acquiring all the rights 
and the duties that came with ownership. 10 The landlord-tenant law that 
developed was consistent with this theory of the tenant's possessory in-
terest. 11 The rule of caveat emptor, "let the buyer beware," governed the 
landlord-tenant agreement. 12 Thus, there was no implied covenant that 
the premises were fit for the tenant's use.13 The caveat emptor arrange-
ment served the needs of the agrarian economy because land was of para-
mount value and the farmer-lessee was capable of taking care of the 
property. 14 
The landlord-tenant agreement imposed no obligations on the land-
lord other than the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. IS The covenant 
protected the lessee from interference in the use and possession of the 
premises by the lessor or anyone claiming rights under him.16 This im-
plied covenant, however, could be negated by express agreement,I1 In 
the absence of an express agreement, the covenant of quiet enjoyment 
was breached by an actual or constructive eviction of the tenant. IS 
Therefore, a breach of the covenant relieved the tenant from the obliga-
tion to pay rent. 19 
9. 1 H. TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 49, at 338 (1912). 
10. Lesar, supra note 8, at 1280. 
11. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 1:1, at 2-3. 
12. Id., § 1:1, at 2. 
13. Lesar, supra note 8, at 1280. 
14. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 1:1, at 3; Lesar, supra note 8, at 1286. 
15. 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 91 (3d ed. 1939); see also G. 
THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1129; R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 3: 10, at 109. 
16. G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1130, at 455-56, quoted in Q C Corp. v. Maryland 
Port Admin., 68 Md. App. 181, 198,510 A.2d 1101, 1110, modified, 310 Md. 379, 
529 A.2d 829 (1987); see also H. TIFFANY, supra note 15, § 92, at 139. This princi-
ple was first recognized in Maryland in Baugher v. Wilkins, 16 Md. 35, 44-45 
(1860). The principle was later codified in MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-115 
(1988). The statute provides: 
Id. 
There is no implied covenant of warranty by the grantor as to the title or 
possession in any grant of land or of any interest or estate in land. How-
ever, in a lease, unless the lease provides otherwise, there is an implied 
covenant by the lessor that the lessee shall quietly enjoy the land. 
17. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 3:3, at 95; Morris v. Harris, 9 Gill 20, 27 (1850) 
(implied covenants are controlled or annuled by express covenants between the 
parties). 
18. G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1132, at 471. See generally R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra 
note 8, § 3:4. 
19. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 3:5. Alternative remedies for a breach of the cove-
nant of quiet enjoyment may include damages or an action to recover the premises. 
See generally id., § 3:8. Where damages at law may be inadequate, injunctive relief 
may be ordered to prevent a constructive eviction. See Baltimore Butcher'S Abat-
toir & Live Stock Co. v. Union Rendering Co., 179 Md. 117, 17 A.2d 130 (1941) 
(court affirmed the issuance of an order enjoining the landlord from terminating the 
supply of steam to the leasehold). Termination of the steam supply would have 
been deemed a constructive eviction since steam was vital to the operation of the 
tenant's business. Id. at 120-21,17 A.2d at 132. A split of authority exists over the 
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A constructive eviction resulted when a tenant was forced to vacate 
the property because the landlord allowed conditions to become so un-
bearable that the tenant was deprived of the use and enjoyment of the 
property.20 The actions of an independent third person, however, not 
under claim of title or right from the landlord, did not breach the land-
lord's covenant.21 Therefore, the actions of one tenant, who did not act 
under claim of title or right of the lessor, would not constitute a breach 
of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. 22 Consequently, the tenant would 
remain liable for the rent despite the tenant's abandonment of the prem-
ises in response to the disturbing conduct of another tenant. 
This situation existed because the legal relationship between a land-
lord and his tenant was insufficient to create an obligation on part of the 
landlord to control one tenant's conduct for the benefit of another ten-
ant.23 Therefore, under the traditional common law approach, the land-
lord was not accountable to one tenant for the failure to enforce 
restrictive lease provisions against another tenant. 24 The landlord, under 
the traditional common law approach, was required to have actively sup-
ported or encouraged the disturbing conduct in order for a tenant's con-
duct to be attributed to the landlord for purposes of finding a 
constructive eviction.25 
availability of damages for a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment when the 
tenant has not vacated the premises. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 3:8, at 106. 
The Maryland courts have followed the common law position. McNally v. Moser, 
210 Md. 127, 139-40, 122 A.2d 555, 562 (1956) (to constitute constructive eviction 
the landlord's act must have been done with the intent and have the effect of depriv-
ing the tenant of the use and enjoyment of the premises); Stevan v. Brown, 54 Md. 
App. 235, 240, 458 A.2d 466, 470 (1983) (a constructive eviction occurs when the 
acts of a landlord cause serious or substantial interference with the tenant's enjoy-
ment of the premises so that the tenant vacates). 
20. G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1132, at 471 (constructive eviction involves the sur-
render of possession by the tenant on justifiable grounds); R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra 
note 8, § 3:5 (actions of the landlord which fall short of physical expulsion but 
which are so injurious to the enjoyment and use of the premises as to justify aban-
donment constitute constructive eviction). 
21. G. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1130, at 458. 
22. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 3:7; see also lA A. CASNER, AMERICAN LAW OF 
PROPERTY, § 3.53 (1952) (most American courts hold that the lessor is not liable to 
a tenant for the acts of another tenant even if the acts complained of violate a provi-
sion common to all leases). 
23. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 3:7. 
24. A. CASNER, supra note 22; see also Eley v. L. & L. Mfg. Co., 30 Ga. App. 595, 118 
S.E. 583 (1923) (tenants are strangers under the law; where a tenant is disturbed by 
another tenant, the disturbing tenant is liable, not the landlord, despite a clause in 
lease against excess noise); Katz v. Duffy, 261 Mass. 149, 158 N.E. 264 (1927) (in 
order for there to be an eviction, landlord must perform some act on the premises; 
conduct of other tenants, however disturbing, does not constitute an eviction); see 
generally Annotation, 41 A.L.R. 2d 1414 (1955). 
25. See, e.g., Thompson v. Harris, 9 Ariz. App. 341,452 P.2d 122 (1969) (another ten-
ant's employee used common wall as toilet; court held that breach of quiet enjoy-
ment did not extend to acts of other tenants unless acts are performed on behalf of 
landlord; landlord did not assume duty by addressing problem with other tenant); 
Stewart v. Lawson, 199 Mich. 497, 165 N.W. 716 (1917) (landlord not liable for acts 
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Strict adherence to the traditional common law approach, however, 
was disregarded in some cases where the disturbing conduct of the other 
tenant involved immoral conduct.26 For example, in Milheim v. Bax-
ter,27 the tenant vacated her premises when the other tenants' immoral 
conduct on the landlord's adjoining property prevented the tenant from 
the free use and enjoyment of her premises.28 The landlord was charged 
with knowingly permitting the other tenants' immoral conduct because 
the adjoining property had been used as an assignation house for some 
time.29 The Supreme Court of Colorado rejected the landlord's argu-
ment that the tenant could not abandon the premises without first re-
questing that the landlord terminate the offending conduct.30 Thus, the 
court determined that the landlord's actual knowledge of the conditions, 
which justified the tenant's vacation of the premises, was sufficient to 
state a cause of action for constructive eviction.31 
As social patterns have changed, the courts' treatment of a lease as a 
conveyance of an interest in land has become increasingly supplanted 
with modem contract principles.32 The high visibility of management 
and the use of extensive lease restrictions in multi-unit housing has cre-
ated the reasonable expectation that landlords have the authority and the 
ability to control their tenants' use of the premises.33 Urban tenants of 
of other tenant, and fact that landlord allowed disturbing conduct to continue is not 
enough to create liability unless landlord gave active support or encouragement); 
Seaboard Realty Co. v. Fuller, 33 Misc. 109, 67 N.Y.S. 146 (1900) (an eviction 
cannot come from conduct, no matter how harmful, unless committed, encouraged, 
or connived by the landlord). 
26. lA A. CASNER, supra note 22; see also Lancashire v. Garford Mfg. Co., 199 Mo. 
App. 418, 203 S.W. 668 (1918) (premises used as a bawdy house where thieves 
frequented); J.W. Cushman & Co. v. Thompson, 58 Misc. 539, 109 N.Y.S. 757 
(1908) (landlord's failure to correct problem of other tenants' immoral conduct was 
a valid defense to action for rent). But cf Brauer v. Kaufman, 72 Misc. 2d 718, 339 
N.Y.S. 2d 373 (1972) (tenants complained of unlawful conduct of alleged prostitutes 
in the building; nevertheless, the court noted that criminal activity has become a 
way of life, and without evidence connecting prostitutes' conduct to the landlord, 
failure to pay rent is actionable). 
27. 46 Colo. 155, 103 P. 376 (1909). 
28. Id. at 157, 103 P. at 377. 
29. Id. at 158, 103 P. at 377. 
30.Id. 
31. Id. at 157, 103 P. at 377; see also Keenan v. Flanigan, 157 La. 749, 751, 103 So. 30, 
31 ( 1925) (once landlord had been notified of a continuing disturbance, his failure to 
correct the problem amounted to a condonation of the action); Maple Terrace 
Apartment Co. v. Simpson, 22 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex. 1929) (court found manage-
ment sanctioned lease violation when a dog was kept in violation of lease and man-
agement had knowledge and did not object). 
32. Cribbet, Conveyance Reform, 35 N.Y.V. L. REV. 1291, 1296-97 (1960). "Law sel-
dom changes society; it only reflects and confirms changes that have already oc-
curred. The shift from rights to duties as a focus of emphasis followed a major shift 
in land use from rural to urban." Id.; see R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 1:1, at 2; 
see generally Goetz, Wherefore the Landlord- Tenant Law "Revolution"? Some Com-
ments, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 592, 599 (1984). 
33. Humbach, Landlord Control of Tenant Behavior: An Instance of Private Environ-
mental Legislation, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 224, 240 n.44 (1976). 
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the twentieth century are more concerned with the services and amenities 
provided with the rental property than with the rights their agrarian 
counterparts acquired through ownership of an estate in land.34 Thus, 
leases today are viewed not only as estates in land but also as bilateral 
contracts.35 This modem approach to leases forces the landlord to exer-
cise control over his tenants where that ability exists because failure to 
act could result in a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and 
therefore, the constructive eviction of other tenants. 36 This approach is 
in harmony with the trend of increasing landlords' liability in other 
areas. 37 
An example of a court's application of the modem approach is the 
case of Blackett v. Olano.ff.38 In Blackett, the landlord leased property 
for commercial use in the same area where the landlord had leased prop-
erty for residential uses.39 The commercial lease expressly provided that 
noise created by the activities of the commercial tenants must not reach a 
level that would disturb the residential tenants on the adjacent prop-
erty.40 The landlord failed to control the noise created by the commer-
cial tenants and the residential tenants vacated their homes.41 The 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that the tenants 
were justified in vacating the premises under these circumstances because 
of the landlord's ability to control the disturbance.42 Therefore, under 
34. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 1:1, at 3. 
35. [d. at 2-3; see also 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 686 (1960) (a fonnal 
lease of land is both a conveyance and a contract). 
36. See generally Restatement (Second) of Property § 6.1 comment d (1977); A. 
CASNER, supra note 24. 
37. See Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 
1970) (landlord held liable for criminal attack on tenant in common areas); lavins v. 
First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (leases of urban dwellings 
are to be treated as contracts; warranty of habitability is implied in every lease and 
cannot be circumvented by exculpatory provisions); Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 
359 A.2d 548 (1976) (landlord has duty to exercise reasonable care for tenant's 
safety when it is known that criminal activity is occurring on the premises); see also 
Friedman, Comments on Edward H. Rabin. The Revolution in Residential Land-
lord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 585, 587 (1984) 
(arguing that there has been no real "revolution" in law of landlord and tenant). 
38. 371 Mass. 714, 358 N.E.2d 817 (1977). 
39. [d. at 715, 358 N.E.2d at 818. 
40. [d. at 716,358 N.E.2d at 819. 
41. [d. at 715, 358 N.E.2d at 818. It was also shown that the landlord promised each 
tenant that he would correct the situation and that the landlord made unsuccessful 
attempts to remedy the problem. [d. 
42. /d. at 718, 358 N.E.2d at 820. The furthest extention of the modern approach is 
demonstrated by Hannan v. Harper, 189 Wis. 588, 208 N.W. 255 (1926), in which 
an injunction was granted to a tenant thereby preventing the landlord from leasing 
an upstairs apartment to a fraternity. [d. at 596-99, 208 N.W. at 259. The presence 
of a fraternity clubhouse above a family residence was viewed as an anticipatory 
breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment because it was impossible to expect that 
the residence would be suitable for family living with a fraternity overhead. [d. (this 
decision fonns the basis for illustration 12 of Restatement (Second) of Property 
§ 6.1 (1977». 
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the modem approach, a landlord's failure to correct known lease viola-
tions by a tenant may constitute a violation of another tenant's lease.43 
No Maryland case prior to Bocchini v. Gorn Management Co. 44 had 
addressed the issue of whether a landlord could be liable for a breach of 
the covenant of quiet enjoyment by constructive eviction of one tenant 
resulting from the landlord's failure to control another tenant's actions.45 
In one recent case, however, Q C Corporation v. Maryland Port Adminis-
tration,46 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland considered whether a 
landlord could be liable for breach of the covenant· of quiet enjoyment 
and constructive eviction because of interference which emanated from 
property adjacent to the tenant and owned by the landlord.47 In Q C 
Corporation, the landlord leased property adjacent to Q C Corporation to 
an independent contractor for the performance of the landlord's contrac-
tual obligation to dispose of hazardous wastes.48 The disposal of these 
wastes resulted in the contamination of Q C Corporation's operations 
and ultimately forced Q C Corporation to vacate the premises.49 Consis-
tent with the traditional approach, the court concluded that these facts 
could constitute a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and con-
structive eviction because the acts causing the substantial interference to 
Q C Corporation were performed by a party claiming rights under the 
landlord, and arguably by the landlord itself. 50 
43. See Blackett v. Olanoff, 371 Mass. 714, 358 N.E.2d 817 (1977); Eskanos & Supper-
stein v. Irwin, 637 P.2d 403 (Colo. App. 1981) (court in Eskanos held that tenant 
must show that noise made premises unsuitable, and that landlord could control the 
noise); see also Rockrose Assoc. v. Peters, 81 Misc. 2d 971, 972, 366 N.Y.S.2d 567, 
568 (1975) (court found that landlord's failure to stop disturbing conduct amounted 
to an assent to the conduct, constituting a constructive eviction); Bruckner v. 
Helfaer, 197 Wis. 582, 222 N.W. 790 (1929) (apartment lease restricted excessive 
noise and landlord ignored tenant's repeated complaints; tenant was justified in 
vacating). 
44. 69 Md. App. I, 515 A.2d 1179 (1986). 
45. In an early case, Baugher v. Wilkens, 16 Md. 35,44-45 (1860), the court of appeals 
held that there was no breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment where the tenant 
exceeded the authorization of the landlord by altering a party wall. The court found 
no breach because the covenant encompassed only acts of the lessor and not acts of 
a third party. Id. 
In Sigmund v. Howard Bank, 29 Md. 324 (1868), however, the court refused to 
extend the scope of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment to impose a duty on the 
landlord to put a tenant in possession. Id. at 328. Therefore the tenant had no 
defense against the landlord's action for rent after refusing to take the premises after 
the holdover tenant vacated. Id. at 329. The tenant's sole remedy was at law 
against the prior tenant given that the prior tenant's wrongful conduct did not con-
stitute a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Id. 
46. 68 Md. App. 181, 510 A.2d 1101 (1986), modified, 310 Md. 379, 529 A.2d 829 
(1987) (judgment on the breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and constructive 
eviction counts not appealed). 
47. Id. at 199,510 A.2d at 1110. 
48. Id. at 195, 510 A.2d at 1108. 
49. Id. at 196-97, 510 A.2d at 1008-09. 
50. Id. at 198, 510 A.2d at 1110. 
202 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 17 
In Bocchini v. Gorn Management CO.,51 the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland adopted the modern view of the covenant of quiet 
enjoyment and constructive eviction. 52 The court recognized that a land-
lord can be liable for a breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment 
and constructive eviction when the landlord is in a position to control the 
disturbing conduct of another tenant and fails to do so. 53 The court rea-
soned that the principle purpose of lease restrictions is to permit a land-
lord to control a tenant's conduct, especially in a multi-unit apartment 
lease, and thereby protect other tenants' rights to the quiet enjoyment of 
their homes. 54 Therefore, the court found it both unjust and unreasona-
ble to allow a landlord to escape his duties by refusing to exercise his 
authority. 55 The court further suggested, in dicta, that the landlord's au-
thority to control the tenant's conduct need not be derived solely from 
the lease and could come from something implied in the lease or parol to 
the lease. 56 In conclusion, applying the modern approach, the court 
found that the tenant stated a claim for a breach of quiet enjoyment and 
thus reversed the dismissal of the lower court. 57 
The court in Bocchini was warranted in adopting the modern ap-
proach. This approach is fair and reasonable because it comports with 
modern urban expectations of the landlord-tenant relationship. 58 The 
landlord's use of restrictive provisions governing conduct of all tenants, 
51. 69 Md. App. 1,515 A.2d 1179. 
52. Bocchini v. Gom Management Co., 69 Md. App. at 12, 515 A.2d at 1185. 
53. [d. Because the tenant in Bocchini vacated the apartment, there was no need for the 
court to address the relationship between the breach of the covenant of quiet enjoy-
ment and constructive eviction. [d. Furthermore, the court did not explore the ef-
fect of a tenant's notice to the landlord of the disturbance prior to vacating the 
premises. The facts alleged in Bocchini demonstrate that the tenant did notify the 
landlord of the problems after the tenant failed to solve them herself. [d. at 4-5, 515 
A.2d at 1181. It remains to be addressed whether this notice to the landlord and the 
opportunity to cure is required before the court will consider the abandonment a 
constructive eviction. See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 3:5, at 99 (tenant must 
abandon premises within reasonable time after disturbance begins but only after 
landlord has no opportunity to cure); cf Milheim v. Baxter, 46 Colo. ISS, 103 P. 
376 (1909) (tenant permitted to rely on defense of constructive eviction without 
prior complaint to landlord). 
The landlord in Bocchini also attempted to argue that the tenant's sole remedy 
was the rent escrow provisions of sections 9-9 and 9-9A of the Baltimore City Code. 
Bocchini, 69 Md. App. at 12-13, 515 A.2d at 1185. The court rejected this argument 
reasoning that the rent escrow provisions pertain to the physical conditions of the 
premises. [d. Even assuming the breach fell within those provisions, the court still 
rejected the landlord's argument on the grounds that the language of the statute 
indicates that it is intended as an additional remedy to the common law remedies, 
not as a replacement. [d. at 13-14, 515 A.2d at 1186; see supra note 19 (discussion 
of common law remedies). 
54. Bocchini, 69 Md. App. at 12, 515 A.2d at 1185. 
55. [d. 
56. [d. at 12, 515 A.2d at 1185 ("where, through lease provisions or otherwise, he has 
that ability .... ") (emphasis added). 
57. [d. 
58. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 1:1, at 3. 
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especially in multi-unit housing,59 instills an expectation on the part of 
the tenant that the control will be exercised.60 Thus, requiring a landlord 
to enforce the restrictions in his lease is consistent with the contractual 
aspect of the modern lease. 
The court, however, left open the question of whether a landlord 
will be expected to exercise control in the absence of specific lease provi-
sions. The question exists because of the court's indirect suggestion that 
the landlord's authority to control could come from something other 
than the restrictive lease provisions. 61 This would appear a logical extell-
tion of the court's holding based upon the application of implied contract 
principles.62 The court's failure to specify other origins of this duty, 
however, opens the door to the possibility that a court may recognize an 
implied authority to control all aspects of tenants' conduct. 
The Bocchini court, in adopting the modern view of the breach of 
the covenant of quiet enjoyment and constructive eviction, recognized 
that a tenant may have a cause of action against a landlord for distur-
bances caused by another tenant. The cause of action exists when the 
activity of the tenant is restricted by a lease provision and the landlord 
knows or should know of the disturbing tenant's activity. The court has 
chosen a rule consistent with the expectations and realities of the modem 
urban landlord-tenant relationship. 
Susan Schuppner Sands 
59. Id.; see Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 
443,451-52 (1972). These concepts may also apply in the commercial lease setting. 
Compare Eskanos & Sapperstein v. Irwin, 637 P.2d 403 (Colo. App. 1981) (con-
structive eviction of commercial tenant by disturbing conduct of other commercial 
tenants in shopping center) and Blackett v. Olanoff, 371 Mass. 714, 358 N.E.2d 817 
(1977) (constructive eviction of residential tenant by disturbing conduct of nearby 
commercial tenant) with Q C Corp. v. Maryland Port Admin., 68 Md. App. 181, 
510 A.2d 1101 (1986), modified, 310 Md. 379, 529 A.2d 829 (1987) (commercial 
tenant was constructively evicted by another commercial tenant; however, the dis-
turbing tenant was in effect the agent of the landlord). 
60. Friedman, supra note 33, at 587; Humbach, supra note 36, at 225. 
61. Bocchini, 69 Md. App. at 12, 515 A.2d at 1185. 
62. See generally 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 35, § 561. There are many cases in which a 
contract containing one promise has been found to contain another promise by im-
plication. /d. 
